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Tipton v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court: Determining the
Retroactive Applicability of Montana’s DNA Statute to Offenses
Time-Barred Prior to the DNA Statute’s 2007 Enactment
Haley Ford
Oral arguments are set for April 18, 2018, at 10:30 AM in the
Strand Union Building, Ballroom A, Montana State University, Bozeman,
Montana.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a case of first impression in Montana.1 At issue is whether
the Montana Legislature’s 2007 amendment to section 45–1–205(9) of the
Montana Code Annotated, permitting prosecution within one year
following conclusive identification by DNA for specific sexual crimes,
can be applied retroactively as to Petitioner Ronald Tipton (“Tipton”)
when the applicable statute of limitations ran prior to the amendment’s
enactment.2 Tipton argues in effect that since the applicable statute of
limitations ran in 2001, his subsequent prosecution based on the 2007
amendment to § 45–1–205(9) is prohibited because, since the statute of
limitations in his case had previously run, he has a vested right to be free
from prosecution based on the ex post facto clauses in the U.S. and
Montana Constitutions.3
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 20, 1987, a 10-year-old girl was the victim of sexual
intercourse without consent.4 The applicable statute of limitations was five
years from the date of the offense.5 In 1988, following an investigation and
prosecution, the State sentenced another man, Jimmy Bromgard, to prison
for the crime.6
In 1989, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the
Legislature amended the relevant statute of limitations to allow for the
1

Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control at 1, Tipton v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0678%20Writ%20%20Supervisory%20Control%20--%20Petition?id={D0E8C05F-0000-C015-9384F37DEDD1A558} (Mont. Nov. 15, 2017) (No. OP 17-0678).
2
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–1–205(9) (2017).
3
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 5–9; U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S.
CONST art. I, § 9, cl. 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31.
4
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Tipton v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District
Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2017-0678%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20-%20Response/Objection?id={90B04761-0000-CB1A-AB0D-658808F2EAE1} (Mont. Jan. 29,
2018) (No. OP 17-0678).
5
Id. at 3; § 45–5–503(3) (1985).
6
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 2, 17–18.

2018
23

PREVIEW: TIPTON V. 13TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

commencement of prosecution up to five years after the victim’s 18th
birthday.7 Because the victim turned 18 in May of 1996, the statute of
limitations conclusively expired in May of 2001, five years later.8
In 2001, the Legislature again amended the applicable statute of
limitations to allow for the commencement of prosecution up to ten years
after the victim’s 18th birthday, effective October 1, 2001.9 This
amendment did not affect Tipton because the applicable statute of
limitations had expired prior to the amendment’s October 2001 effective
date.10
In 2002, DNA evidence exonerated Bromgard, and the case went
unresolved.11
In 2007, the Legislature added a section pertaining to DNA
evidence to the general statute of limitations.12 It provided that:
If a suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing
after a time period prescribed [for sexual intercourse
without consent with a minor victim] has expired, a
prosecution may be commenced within 1 year after the
suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing.13
In 2015, the State matched Tipton’s DNA, collected in an
unrelated matter, to the DNA evidence preserved from the unresolved
1987 rape.14 The State commenced prosecution within one year.15
Tipton moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the statute of
limitations had expired.16 On November 6, 2017, the district court denied
Tipton’s motion.17 Tipton then petitioned for a Writ of Supervisory
Control requesting dismissal of his charges.18
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner Tipton

Tipton rests his argument on the long-established principle that
when the statute of limitations expires, it confers a vested right to be free
from subsequent prosecution.19 Tipton argues that once a prosecution is
time-barred, it cannot be revived through amendment of the statute of
7

Id. at 3; § 45–1–205(1)(b) (1989).
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 1.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 2.
11
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 2.
12
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 2.
13
Id.; § 45–1–205(9) (2017).
14
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 19.
15
Id. at 2.
16
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 2.
17
Id. at 4–5.
18
Id. at 9.
19
Id. at 7.
8

24

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 79

limitations.20 Tipton asserts that he was free from prosecution after May,
2001, when the applicable statute of limitations had conclusively run.21
The Legislature’s later amendment to the statute of limitations in 2007
extending the time for prosecution following the discovery of DNA
evidence did not impact Tipton’s vested right to be free from prosecution
after May, 2001.22
To support his argument, Tipton points to the prohibition against
ex post facto laws found in similar provisions in the U.S. and Montana
Constitutions.23 The latter provides, “[n]o ex post facto law nor any law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of
special privilege, franchises, or immunities shall be passed by the
legislature.”24 Tipton agrees that the clauses’ prohibitions against ex post
facto laws permit prosecution when the Legislature extends a statute of
limitations before the statute has expired. However, he asserts that when
the Legislature does so after the statute has expired, the clauses prohibit
prosecution.25 This is because “‘to resurrect a prosecution after the
relevant statute of limitations has expired, it is to eliminate a currently
existing conclusive presumption from forbidding prosecution.’”26
B. Respondents Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court and
Honorable Mary Jane Knisely
Respondents begin by asserting that § 45–1–205(9) can be applied
retroactively because it meets the standard set forth under § 1–2–109,
which provides that “[n]o law contained in any of the statues of Montana
are retroactive unless expressly so declared.”27 Respondents argue that
because § 45–1–205(9) permits prosecution after the original statute of
limitations has run following the discovery of new DNA evidence, it is
inherently retroactive under the meaning of § 1–2–109 based on its plain
language.28 Respondents then state that a statute is impermissibly
retroactive under § 1–2–109 only when it “‘takes away or impairs vested
rights, acquired under existing laws.’”29 Thus, Respondents conclude that
because an amendment of a statute of limitations “affects only procedural
matters and does not relate to substantive rights of a party,”30 the 2007

20

Id.
Id. at 1.
22
Id. at 8–9.
23
Id. at 6; U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31.
24
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31.
25
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 7–9.
26
Id. at 8 (quoting Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616 (2003)).
27
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 6–7.
28
Id. at 7.
29
Id. at 8 (quoting Allen v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 124 P.3d 132, 135 (citations omitted)).
30
Id. (citing State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Sky Country, 78 P.2d 1135, 1137 (1989)).
21
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amendment to § 45–1–205(9) is permissibly retroactive as applied to
Tipton.31
Respondents then turn to the ex post facto provisions in both the
U.S. and Montana Constitutions.32 First, Respondents concede that § 45–
1–205(9) is “technically unconstitutional as applied to Tipton,” citing
Mordja v. Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court,33 which references
Stogner v. California34 and holds that “[t]he prohibition against ex post
facto laws found in both the United States and Montana Constitutions
would prevent an amended statute of limitations from reviving a
previously time-barred prosecution.”35 Astonishingly, Respondents then
“request[] this Court to find an exception” to the constitutional principle
described in Stogner.36
To support this request, Respondents point to the policy behind
the DNA statute, that society has a great interest in prosecuting individuals
identified conclusively by DNA evidence for sexual crimes.37
Respondents initially cite the four categories of ex post facto laws
described in Stogner,38 but then they confuse the issues by inaccurately
treating the four categories as factors when only the second category is
presently at issue.39 Respondents assert that the second factor (category)
asks whether “the law makes the punishment for the crime more
burdensome,” claiming that the punishment here is not more burdensome
because Tipton was charged under the 1987 law.40
In conclusion, Respondents summarize that, since the intent of the
Legislature in amending § 45–1–205(9) was to “allow the State to
prosecute unsolvable sexually violent crimes with the power of DNA” if
the State commenced prosecution within one year following DNA
identification, “fairness for the victim” justifies Respondents’ request to
except the present constitutional violation.41
IV.

31

ANALYSIS

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 11.
33
177 P.3d 439 (2008).
34
539 U.S. 607 (2003).
35
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 12–13 (quoting Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443
(citations omitted)).
36
Id. at 13.
37
Id. at 13–14.
38
Id. at 10–11 (quoting Stogner, 539 U.S. at 612 (the four categories are “1st Every law that makes
an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offence, in order to convict the offender.”)).
39
Id. at 15–16.
40
Id. at 15.
41
Id. at 19–20.
32
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Respondents misconstrue the meaning of “retroactive” under § 1–
2–109 by implying that since § 45–1–205(9) is permissibly retroactivelooking under the 2007 amendment, it must permissibly apply
retroactively to Tipton.42 However, Respondents’ interpretation glances
over the fact that the applicable statute of limitations for Tipton had
already run in 2001, six years before the amendment was enacted.
As the Montana Supreme Court explains in Mordja, under § 1–2–
109, “a statute is not ‘retroactive’ merely because it draws upon antecedent
facts for its operation,” but that “a statute is ‘retroactive’ in a legal sense
‘which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws
or creates a new obligation.’”43 Thus, whether a statute is “retroactive”
under § 1–2–109 depends on first, whether a defendant “has any vested
right in the statute of limitations,” and second, whether the amendment in
question “impairs or strips [the defendant’s] vested rights.”44
The Montana Supreme Court answers the first question by
confirming whether the applicable statute of limitations has run; where it
has, the defendant has a vested right to be free from prosecution.45 The
Court answers the second question by referencing Stogner, where a
defendant’s vested right in an expired statute of limitations was
impermissibly impaired by an amendment to the statute of limitations
which revived previously time-barred prosecutions.46 There, the
amendment “violated the ex post facto clause because it inflicted
punishment upon [the defendant] where, by law, he was not liable to any
punishment,” falling under the second category of ex post facto laws.47
Notably, this directly contradicts Respondents’ “more burdensome”
interpretation of the second category, despite Respondents having used the
same case for their argument.48 To be clear, this second category of ex post
facto laws includes “[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was, when committed,” or in other words, a law that “inflicts
punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment.”49
Under this category, the Court concluded that “[t]he prohibition against ex
post facto laws…prevent[s] an amended statute of limitations from
reviving a previously time-barred prosecution,” because a defendant has a
vested right in the expiration of a statute of limitations.50
Thus, a statute can be “retroactive” under § 1–2–109 as applied to
a defendant when first, the applicable statute of limitations has
42

Id. at 6–9.
Mordja v. Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, 177 P.3d 439, 442 (2008) (quoting State v.
Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1012 (1979) (reversed in part on other grounds)).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 443.
46
Id. (referencing 539 U.S. 607).
47
Id. (citing Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 613 (2003)).
48
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 4, at 15–16.
49
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 8; Stogner, 539 U.S. at 613 (quoting and
adding emphasis to Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798)).
50
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443.
43
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conclusively run, and second, the statute is later amended and prosecution
commenced against the defendant when by law, the defendant is no longer
liable to any punishment.51 This is exactly Tipton’s situation: in May,
2001, the applicable statute of limitations conclusively ran and Tipton was
no longer liable under law to punishment for the 1987 rape. Therefore, §
1–2–109 is “retroactive” as applied to Tipton under established Montana
precedent.52
This is distinguishable from a hypothetical situation where, before
a statute of limitations has expired in a given case, the statute is amended
to extend to a later point in time.53 This is because “the amendment of an
unexpired statute of limitations does not affect a vested right, and therefore
does not violate due process or the prohibition against ex post facto
laws.”54 In summary, the Montana Supreme Court has held that “where a
statute is amended to extend the limitations period for a criminal offense,
the extended limitations period applies to all offenses not barred at the time
the amendment was enacted.”55 Conversely, the extended limitations
period does not apply to any offense already time-barred on the date the
amendment was enacted.
Tipton was vested with the right to be free from prosecution when
the applicable statute of limitations ran in 2001. The Legislature’s
amendment of § 45–1–205(9) in 2007 did not affect Tipton’s
constitutionally provided right to be free from prosecution conferred by
the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Montana Constitutions.56 Thus,
the Court will all but certainly reverse the district court and remand for
dismissal.

51

Id. at 442; Stogner, 539 U.S. at 610.
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 8–9; Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443.
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, supra note 1, at 8–9.
54
Id. at 6–7; Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443.
55
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443–44.
56
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31.
52
53

